



K. Reiter, Mohnen, A., & **G. Walkowitz** (2024). The Impact of Virtual Computer Screen Backgrounds on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Online Videoconferences, in press, *Computers in Human Behavior Reports*.

Abstract. We investigate the influence of real and virtual computer screen backgrounds in Zoom videoconferences on subjective performance evaluation. Using an incentivized online experiment ($N = 210$), we systematically vary workers' computer screen backgrounds in a supervisor–worker bargaining situation carried out in a videoconference. We find a significant influence of workers' applied computer screen backgrounds on supervisors' subjective performance evaluations, with significantly more positive ratings when workers use a virtual white background than a real white background ($d = 0.47$). This finding is robust when we control for workers' measurable and salient objective performance and gender and for supervisors' gender and age. Regarding the underlying processes, we show that supervisors' perceptions of the workers' likability and trustworthiness enhance subjective performance evaluations when virtual white videoconference backgrounds are applied. Practical implications for the application of human resource practices in digitalized environments are discussed.



H. Hennig-Schmidt, Li, Z., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2024). Fairness Deliberations and Fair Allocations in Symmetric and Asymmetric Bargaining—An Experimental Study on Group Decisions in Germany and China, in press, *Group Decision and Negotiation*.

Abstract. The study's primary focus is on examining fairness deliberations of bargainers in Germany and in China under symmetric and asymmetric bargaining power to understand whether they incorporate fairness into their decision process and, if so, how this affects bargaining outcomes. To this end, we conducted an incentivized ultimatum bargaining experiment with symmetric and asymmetric outside options. Groups ($N = 142$) of three persons interact as proposers and responders in dyads and decide simultaneously on their offer or which offers to accept or reject. Communication between parties is inhibited. We videotaped in-group discussions; the resulting transcripts were text analyzed by eliciting whether groups make fairness an issue, which fairness norms they discuss, and whether they use fairness-related perspective-taking to overcome the communication constraint. We find that asymmetry of bargaining power in favor of the proposer leads to lower offers relative to the symmetric situation. Not all groups make fairness an issue, and fairness deliberations alone have no significant impact on offers. However, when associated with the equal-payoff norm, and in Chinese groups in particular, discussing fairness increases offers in symmetric but also in asymmetric situations, in which other fairness norms could have been applied, too. Fairness-related perspective-taking is used by German and Chinese groups and is associated with higher offers in the former. Our study makes an epistemological and related methodological contribution: a possibly biased interpretation of bargaining outcomes can be mitigated if information on decision processes and underlying mechanisms were available.



Schönmann, M., Bodenschatz, A., Uhl, M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2024). Contagious humans: A pandemic's positive effect on attitudes towards care robots. *Technology in Society*, 76, 102464.

Abstract. History has shown that attitudes toward new technologies can change abruptly following disruptive events. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it became apparent that care robots enable increased social isolation. This feature of robotic care usually raises strong ethical concerns about potentially decreased comfort for the care-dependent. In a large-scale online study, we tested the influence of the pandemic on people's affective attitudes toward care robots. In vignettes on different care scenarios, we measured participants' perceived comfort levels in situations with care robots and human caregivers while controlling for their fear of infection with a viral disease. We found that people generally feel less comfortable with a care robot than with a human caregiver. However, those who had a strong fear of being infected during the pandemic did not devalue a care robot compared to a human caregiver. While care robots remain ethically contested, this study shows that affective attitudes toward care robots may change significantly if they can address an urgent need.

— 2023 —



Schönmann, M., Bodenschatz, A., Uhl, M. & **Walkowitz, G.** (2023). The Care-Dependent are Less Averse to Care Robots: An Empirical Comparison of Attitudes. *International Journal of Social Robotics*, 15, 1007-1024.

Abstract. A growing gap is emerging between the supply of and demand for professional caregivers, not least because of the ever-increasing average age of the world's population. One strategy to address this growing gap in many regions is the use of care robots. Although there have been numerous ethical debates about the use of robots in nursing and elderly care, an important question remains unexamined: how do the potential recipients of such care perceive situations with care robots compared to situations with human caregivers? Using a large-scale experimental vignette study, we investigated people's affective attitudes toward care robots. Specifically, we studied the influence of the caregiver's nature on participants' perceived comfort levels when confronted with different care scenarios in nursing homes. Our results show that the care-robot-related views of actual care recipients (i.e., people who are already affected by care dependency) differ substantially from the views of people who are not affected by care dependency. Those who do not (yet) rely on care placed care robots' value far below that of human caregivers, especially in a service-oriented care scenario. This devaluation was not found among care recipients, whose perceived level of comfort was not influenced by the caregiver's nature. These findings also proved robust when controlled for people's gender, age, and general attitudes toward robots.

— 2022 —



Walkowitz, G., Belianin, A., & Dorrrough, A. R. (2022). Inter-cultural cooperation: The role of attitudes,(shared) expectations, and behavioral standards. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 13, 1044588.

Abstract. The goal of the Research Topic is to offer new perspectives for reflecting and disentangling the determining factors of inter-cultural cooperation. A distinction is made between an intra-cultural and an inter-cultural view to better understand the potential impact of attitudes formed within national cultures on behavior in inter-cultural situations. The collected papers cover and address different forms of intra- and inter-cultural social interactions, especially pro-social behaviors, in a variety of ways.

Some of these contribute to our knowledge and understanding of important phenomena of the contemporary world, such as attitudes toward migrants, or experiences of refugees. More generally, all papers make scientific contributions by providing grounded evidence on interconnections between individual values, experiences, preferences, and behavior. No less importantly, these works also yield several null findings, or the absence of expected causalities, thus enhancing our knowledge of the potential limits of existing theories and concepts connecting them.



Jauernig, J., Uhl, M., & Walkowitz, G. (2022). People prefer moral discretion to algorithms: Algorithm aversion beyond intransparency. *Philosophy & Technology*, 35(1), 2.


Abstract. We explore aversion to the use of algorithms in moral decision-making. So far, this aversion has been explained mainly by the fear of opaque decisions that are potentially biased. Using incentivized experiments, we study which role the desire for human discretion in moral decision-making plays. This seems justified in light of evidence suggesting that people might not doubt the quality of algorithmic decisions, but still reject them. In our first study, we found that people prefer humans with decision-making discretion to algorithms that rigidly apply exogenously given human-created fairness principles to specific cases. In the second study, we found that people do not prefer humans to algorithms because they appreciate flesh-and-blood decision-makers per se, but because they appreciate humans' freedom to transcend fairness principles at will. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of algorithm aversion. They indicate that emphasizing the transparency of algorithms that clearly follow fairness principles might not be the only element for fostering societal algorithm acceptance and suggest reconsidering certain features of the decision-making process.

— 2021 —



Bodenschatz, A., Uhl, M., & Walkowitz, G. (2021). Autonomous systems in ethical dilemmas: Attitudes toward randomization. *Computers in Human Behavior Reports*, 4, 100145.

Abstract. It is ethically debatable whether autonomous systems should be programmed to actively impose harm on some to avoid greater harm for others. Surveys on ethical dilemmas in self-driving cars' programming have shown that people favor imposing harm on some people to save others from suffering and are consequently willing to sacrifice smaller groups to save larger ones in unavoidable accident situations. This is, if people are forced to directly impose harm. Contrary to humans, autonomous systems feature a salient deontological alternative for immediate decisions: the ability to randomize decisions over dilemmatic outcomes. To be applicable in democracies, randomization must correspond to people's moral intuition. In three studies ($N = 935$), we present empirical evidence that many people prefer to randomize between dilemmatic outcomes due to moral considerations. We find these preferences in hypothetical and incentivized decision-making situations. We also find that preferences are robust in different contexts and persist across Germany, with its Kantian cultural tradition, and the US, with its utilitarian cultural tradition.



Walkowitz, G. (2021). Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 85, 102387.

Abstract. Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator

game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.

— 2020 —



Goerg, S. J., Rand, D., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2020). Framing effects in the prisoner's dilemma but not in the dictator game. *Journal of the Economic Science Association*, 6, 1-12.

Abstract. We systematically investigate prisoner's dilemma and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects' behavior and beliefs in the prisoner's dilemma games but not in the dictator games. We conclude that valence framing has a stronger impact on behavior in strategic interactions, i.e., in the prisoner's dilemma game, than in allocation tasks without strategic interaction, i.e., in the dictator game.



Susewind, M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2020). Symbolic moral self-completion—social recognition of prosocial behavior reduces subsequent moral striving. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, 560188.

Abstract. According to theories on moral balancing, a prosocial act can decrease people's motivation to engage in subsequent prosocial behavior, because people feel that they have already achieved a positive moral self-perception. However, there is also empirical evidence showing that people actually need to be recognized by others in order to establish and affirm their self-perception through their prosocial actions. Without social recognition, moral balancing could possibly fail. In this paper, we investigate in two laboratory experiments how social recognition of prosocial behavior influences subsequent moral striving. Building on self-completion theory, we hypothesize that social recognition of prosocial behavior (self-serving behavior) weakens (strengthens) subsequent moral striving. In Study 1, we show that a prosocial act leads to less subsequent helpfulness when it was socially recognized as compared to a situation without social recognition. Conversely, when a self-serving act is socially recognized, it encourages subsequent helpfulness. In Study 2, we replicate the effect of social recognition on moral striving in a more elaborated experimental setting and with a larger participant sample. We again find that a socially recognized prosocial act leads to less subsequent helpfulness compared to an unrecognized prosocial act. Our results shed new light on the boundary conditions of moral balancing effects and underscore the view that these effects can be conceptualized as a dynamic of self-completion.

— 2019 —



Gürtler, O., **Walkowitz, G.**, & Wiesen, D. (2019). Do good and talk about it! Disclosure and reward of discretionary kindness. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 161, 323-342.

Abstract. Does it pay off for companies to disclose voluntary commitments to their customers? While voluntary commitments to enhance customers' benefits became prevalent in many markets, systematic evidence on how customers (if at all) reward companies, which disclose such discretionary kindness, is still lacking. We analyze the consequences of endogenous disclosure of discretionary kindness in a novel experiment ($N = 636$). We model the decision situation in a bilateral reciprocity game with asymmetric information on the voluntariness of kindness. Experimental data show that endogenously disclosing discretionary kindness significantly triggers rewards from customers and does not backfire. Findings are robust towards variations in costs of information and the level of customers' benefits. Survey evidence from a vignette study support our behavioral findings.



Lönnqvist, J. E., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2019). Experimentally induced empathy has no impact on generosity in a monetarily incentivized dictator game. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, 337.

Abstract. In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators' empathy toward the Recipients to cause more pro-social allocations. Empathy was experimentally induced via a commonly used perspective taking task. Dictators ($N = 474$) were instructed to split an endowment of 10€ between themselves and an unknown Recipient. They could split the money 8/2 (8€ for Dictator, 2€ for Recipient) or 5/5 (5€ each). Although the empathy manipulation successfully increased Dictators' feelings of empathy toward the Recipients, Dictators' decisions on how to split the money were not affected. We had ample statistical power (above 0.99) to detect a typical social psychology effect (corresponding to r around 0.20). Other possible determinants of generosity in the Dictator Game should be investigated. [Link](#)



Walkowitz, G. (2019). Employers discriminate against immigrants and criminal offenders—Experimental evidence. *Economics Letters*, 174, 140-143.

Abstract. We experimentally study the causal effect of being an immigrant or previously convicted on the hiring preferences and wage payments of employers. We find evidence for statistical discrimination against immigrants. Criminal offenders suffer from more severe and taste discrimination.



Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2019). Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency. *Experimental Economics*, 22, 552-576.

Abstract. We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless

whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects' beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback provision in public goods settings.

— 2018 —



Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2018). Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: A systematic analysis. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 47, 301-329.

Abstract. We set up a laboratory experiment to investigate systematically how varying the magnitude of outside options—the payoffs that materialize in case of a bargaining breakdown—of proposers and responders influences players' demands and game outcomes (rejection rates, payoffs, efficiency) in ultimatum bargaining. We find that proposers as well as responders gradually increase their demands when their respective outside option increases. Rejections become more likely when the asymmetry in the players' outside options is large. Generally, the predominance of the equal split decreases with increasing outside options. From a theoretical benchmark perspective we find a low predictive power of equilibria based on self-regarding preferences or inequity aversion. However, proposers and responders seem to be guided by the equity principle (Selten, 1978), while they apply equity rules inconsistently and self-servingly.

— 2017 —



Walkowitz, G., & Weiss, A. R. (2017). “Read my lips!(but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 142, 348-367.

Abstract. We experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office-holders and increases citizens' trust. Using a novel multi-person investment game with voting, we indeed find that elected office-holders shirk less (i.e., they back-transfer more to citizens relative to investments) than randomly appointed office-holders. Surprisingly, this effect is not driven by electoral competition inflating office-holders' promises. Instead, elected office-holders feel more committed to their promises than their randomly appointed counterparts. Elections initially also increase citizens' trust because voters select candidates with the “right” kind of promises: neither low nor non-credibly high. However, over the course of the entire experiment, we find no evidence that electoral competition increases citizens' trust.



Hennig-Schmidt, H., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2017). Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China. *Games*, 8(4), 44.

Abstract. Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from Germany and China. Over the course of the negotiation, bargainers discuss the distribution of an amount of money by alternating offers until they consent or break off. Legal rights

are randomly assigned by asymmetric outside options. We videotape and code the in-group discussions. In total, verbal data from 30 groups, 1100 pages of transcripts, and 65 h of discussions are content-analyzed. Our main finding is that strong groups derive and defend moral entitlements from equity concerns with regard to their outside options. They strive for equitable but unequal distributions (e.g., proportional split and split the difference). Moral entitlements materialize in the recorded aspiration levels and final payoffs, which exceed the equal split. By contrast, weak groups aim at equality. Over the course of the negotiation, equity tends to lose, while the prominence of round numbers gains importance. Similarities between the subject pools are found in that equity and prominence are both decisive for the formation of aspiration levels. Chinese negotiations are characterized by long periods of stagnation, only minimal concessions, and the communication of false goals. By contrast, Germans steadily reduce their goals and make concessions.



Konstabel, K., Lönnqvist, J. E., Leikas, S., García Velázquez, R., Qin, H., Verkasalo, M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2017). Measuring single constructs by single items: Constructing an even shorter version of the “Short Five” personality inventory. *PloS one*, *12*(8), e0182714.

Abstract. The aim of this study was to construct a short, 30-item personality questionnaire that would be, in terms of content and meaning of the scores, as comparable as possible with longer, well-established inventories such as NEO PI-R and its clones. To do this, we shortened the formerly constructed 60-item “Short Five” (S5) by half so that each subscale would be represented by a single item. We compared all possibilities of selecting 30 items (preserving balanced keying within each domain of the five-factor model) in terms of correlations with well-established scales, self-peer correlations, and clarity of meaning, and selected an optimal combination for each domain. The resulting shortened questionnaire, XS5, was compared to the original S5 using data from student samples in 6 different countries (Estonia, Finland, UK, Germany, Spain, and China), and a representative Finnish sample. The correlations between XS5 domain scales and their longer counterparts from well-established scales ranged from 0.74 to 0.84; the difference from the equivalent correlations for full version of S5 or from meta-analytic short-term dependability coefficients of NEO PI-R was not large. In terms of prediction of external criteria (emotional experience and self-reported behaviours), there were no important differences between XS5, S5, and the longer well-established scales. Controlling for acquiescence did not improve the prediction of criteria, self-peer correlations, or correlations with longer scales, but it did improve internal reliability and, in some analyses, comparability of the principal component structure. XS5 can be recommended as an economic measure of the five-factor model of personality at the level of domain scales; it has reasonable psychometric properties, fair correlations with longer well-established scales, and it can predict emotional experience and self-reported behaviours no worse than S5. When subscales are essential, we would still recommend using the full version of S5.



Conrads, J., Ellenberger, M., Irlenbusch, B., Ohms, E. N., Rilke, R. M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2017). Team goal incentives and individual lying behavior. *Die Betriebswirtschaft*, *76*(1): 103-123.

Abstract. We examine the influence of two goal compensation schemes on lying behavior. We apply an individual and a team incentive scheme. Subjects receive a fixed bonus when attaining the goal. Under team goal incentives subjects are less inclined to over-report production outputs beyond the amount which is on average necessary for goal attainment. Subjects who believe that lying is not profitable (the team goal cannot be reached with a lie) or not absolutely necessary (there is a good chance that the team goal can also be reached without lying) tend to be honest. Subjects who believe that the team goal has already been reached tend to over-report production outputs. Women are found to be more honest than men.

— 2016 —



Goerg, S. J., Hennig-Schmidt, H., **Walkowitz, G.**, & Winter, E. (2016). In wrong anticipation-miscalibrated beliefs between Germans, Israelis, and Palestinians. *PLoS One*, *11*(6), e0156998.

Abstract. The reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an investee/allocator. We found a notable constellation of calibrated and un-calibrated beliefs. Within each country, transfer standards exist, which investees correctly anticipate within their country. However, across countries these standards differ. By attributing the standard of their own environment to the other countries investees are remarkably bad in predicting foreign investors' behavior. The tendency to ignore this potential difference can be a source of misinterpreting motives in cross-country interaction. Foreigners might perceive behavior as unfavorable or favorable differentiation, even though—unknown to them—investors actually treat fellow-country people and foreigners alike.

— 2015 —



Lönnqvist, J. E., Verkasalo, M., **Walkowitz, G.**, & Wichardt, P. C. (2015). Measuring individual risk attitudes in the lab: Task or ask? An empirical comparison. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, *119*, 254-266.

Abstract. This paper reports on an empirical comparison of two prominent measures of individual risk attitudes – the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-item questionnaire advocated by Dohmen et al. (2011) – with respect to their within-subject stability over time (one year) and their correlation with actual risk-taking behavior in the lab – here the amount sent in a trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Our results suggest that the two risk attitude measures are at best only weakly correlated. Only the questionnaire measure shows high test-retest stability, while virtually no such stability is found in the lottery-choice task. In addition, only the questionnaire measure shows the expected correlations with a Big Five personality measure and is correlated with actual risk-taking behavior. With respect to behavior in the trust game, we find a high retest stability of transfers. This supports the conjecture that trusting behavior has a component which itself is a stable individual characteristic.



Lönnqvist, J. E., Rilke, R. M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2015). On why hypocrisy thrives: Reasonable doubt created by moral posturing can deter punishment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *59*, 139-145.

Abstract. In four bargaining games with an option to punish, participants could avoid punishment by shifting the blame for an unfair offer on a random coin flip. Punishments were not affected by whether the results of the coin flip could be verified, nor by beliefs about whether a coin had actually been flipped (Studies 1–3). Our results suggest that the rather blatant moral posturing of hypocrites was enough to create reasonable doubt about their guilt, and that such doubt deterred punishment. Alternative explanations of reluctance to punish hypocrites, such as free-riding from altruistic punishment (Study 2), or feelings of gratitude (Study 3) were not supported. Independent third parties were also less punitive toward those who blamed the coin (Study 4). Similar results were found in an online vignette study run with a more representative sample (Study 5). In sum, these findings suggest that hypocrisy thrives because it can deter punishment.



Hennig-Schmidt, H., & Walkowitz, G. (2015). Negotiations among Chinese and Germans—An experimental case study. *Homo Oeconomicus*, 32(4), 451-488.

Abstract. This paper aims to better understand negotiation behaviour between Germans and Chinese. We study intra- and inter-cultural bargaining in negotiations with asymmetric outside options. Our analysis is based on team decisions and verbal transcripts of video-recorded within- and between-team discussions. The data show the importance of aspiration formation in combination with equity concerns. Before the negotiation starts, all teams already have formulated goals that can be traced during the subsequent negotiation. Moreover, all first offers and demands and the majority of final outcomes represent equitable shares of the amount at stake. Teams often agree upon the ‘Split the Difference’ allocation, which represents a feasible and justifiable compromise. Chinese typically gather as much information on their counterparts as possible, anticipate and simulate their counterparts’ behavior and make harmony an issue. German teams, however, put great emphasis on fairness issues and aim at efficient outcomes by reaching an acceptable payoff within reasonable time.



Lönnqvist, J. E., Hennig-Schmidt, H., & Walkowitz, G. (2015). Ethnicity-and sex-based discrimination and the maintenance of self-esteem. *PLoS One*, 10(5), e0124622.

Abstract. The psychological underpinnings of labor market discrimination were investigated by having participants from Israel, the West Bank and Germany ($N = 205$) act as employers in a stylized employment task in which they ranked, set wages, and imposed a minimum effort level on applicants. State self-esteem was measured before and after the employment task, in which applicant ethnicity and sex were salient. The applicants were real people and all behavior was monetarily incentivized. Supporting the full self-esteem hypothesis of the social identity approach, low self-esteem in women was associated with assigning higher wages to women than to men, and such behavior was related to the maintenance of self-esteem. The narrower hypothesis that successful intergroup discrimination serves to protect self-esteem received broader support. Across all participants, both ethnicity- and sex-based discrimination of out-groups were associated with the maintenance of self-esteem, with the former showing a stronger association than the latter.

— 2014 —



Lönnqvist, J. E., Irlenbusch, B., & Walkowitz, G. (2014). Moral hypocrisy: impression management or self-deception?. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 55, 53-62.


Abstract. In three studies (S1–S3; $N = 256$) we investigated whether moral hypocrisy (MH) is motivated by conscious impression management concerns or whether it is self-deceptive. In a dictator game, MH occurred both within participants (saying one thing, doing another; S1) and between participants (doing one thing when it is inconsequential, doing another thing when it affects payoffs; S2). People were willing to let an ostensibly fair coin determine payoffs only if they could fudge the results of the coin flip, suggesting that hypocrites do not deceive themselves (S3). Also supporting this view, MH was associated with adherence to Conformity values (S1–S2), indicative of a desire to appear moral in the eyes of others but not indicative of self-deception. Universalism values were predictive of moral integrity (S1, S3).



Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., Schielke, A., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2014). Honesty in tournaments. *Economics Letters*, 123(1), 90-93.

Abstract. We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament incentive scheme. Our treatments vary the prize spread. The data highlights that honesty is more pronounced when the prize spread is small.

— 2013 —



Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2013). Lying and team incentives. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 34, 1-7.


Abstract. We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects' inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more.



Lönnqvist, J. E., Verkasalo, M., Wichardt, P. C., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2013). Personal values and prosocial behaviour in strategic interactions: Distinguishing value-expressive from value-ambivalent behaviours. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 43(6), 554-569.

Abstract. Relying on the framework provided by Schwartz's theory of personal values, we investigated whether values can help explain prosocial behaviour. We first distinguished value-expressive behaviours from value-ambivalent behaviours. The former are compatible with primarily one value or with congruent values, the latter with mutually conflicting values. In Study 1, an analysis over all 41 (39 unpublished) samples in which we measured personal values and prosocial behaviour in monetarily incentivized strategic interactions ($N = 1289$; data collected between 2007 and 2010 in China, Finland, Germany, Israel, and the West Bank) supported our idea that personal values, universalism in particular, predict value-expressive (prisoner's dilemma cooperation and trust game back-transfers) but not value-ambivalent behaviours (trust game transfers and ultimatum game proposals and responses). Study 2 ($N = 56$) focused on dictator game behaviours, which we expected and found to be strongly value-expressive. The findings contribute to the ongoing discussion on whether and under which circumstances values shape behaviour.

— 2012 —



Konstabel, K., Lönnqvist, J. E., **Walkowitz, G.**, Konstabel, K., & Verkasalo, M. (2012). The 'Short Five'(S5): Measuring personality traits using comprehensive single items. *European Journal of Personality*, 26(1), 13-29.

Abstract. A new approach to the construction of short questionnaires is introduced: 'comprehensive single items' (CSI) are developed with the intention to match expert descriptions of a construct as closely as possible. Based on this idea, a 60-item questionnaire, the 'Short Five' (S5) is constructed for measuring 30 facets of the Five-Factor Model. Studies in Estonian, Finnish, English, and German showed that the S5 domain scales had correlations over 0.8 with their counterparts in longer questionnaires, and that the factor structure was similar to that of the normative US NEO-PI-R sample. The S5 can be recommended for large-scale studies where participants' time is limited. The CSI approach can be successfully used in short scale development, in addition to more traditional methods.



Lönnqvist, J. E., Verkasalo, M., Wichardt, P. C., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2012). Personality disorder categories as combinations of dimensions: Translating cooperative behavior in borderline personality disorder into the five-factor framework. *Journal of Personality Disorders*, 26(2), 298-304.

Abstract. The authors examined the proposal that personality disorder categories may denote particular detrimental combinations of personality dimensions. A multiround economic exchange game (ten round trust game), conducted with university students pre-selected on basis of their personalities ($N = 164$), provided a framework within which to investigate inability to repair ruptured cooperation. This behavior, thought to be characteristic of patients diagnosed with *DSM-IV* borderline personality disorder, was predicted only by the combination of high Neuroticism and low Agreeableness. Our results highlight an advantage of the categorical approach, category labels being a much more economic means of description than the delineation of interactions between dimensions.

— 2011 —



Lönnqvist, J. E., **Walkowitz, G.**, Verkasalo, M., & Wichardt, P. C. (2011). Situational power moderates the influence of self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values on behavior in ultimatum bargaining. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 45(3), 336-339.


Abstract. We examined the interactive effects of personal values and situational power on proposer and responder behavior in an ultimatum bargaining game. The current literature suggests that situational power could moderate the influence of personal values on behavior. For proposers ($N = 107$), high scores on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension predicted higher proposals, but only among participants told that they were in a powerful position. For responders ($N = 95$), high scores on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension predicted accepting smaller proposals, but again only among participants told that they were in a powerful position. Our results support the idea that high situational power elicits behavior more consistent with one's standing on the Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement value dimension.



Lönnqvist, J. E., Verkasalo, M., & Walkowitz, G. (2011). It pays to pay—Big Five personality influences on co-operative behaviour in an incentivized and hypothetical prisoner's dilemma game. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 50(2), 300-304.

Abstract. The authors investigated how the presence or absence of monetary incentives in a prisoner's dilemma game may influence research outcomes. Specifically, the predictive power of the Big Five personality traits on decisions in an incentivized ($N = 60$) or hypothetical ($N = 60$) prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Participants were less generous in the incentivized game. More importantly, personality predicted decisions only in the incentivized game, with low Neuroticism and high Openness to Experience predicting more cooperative transfers. The influence of Neuroticism on behaviour in the incentivized game was mediated by risk attitude. The results are consistent with other results suggesting that the Big Five are relevant predictors of moral behaviour, and with results suggesting that the determinants of hypothetical decisions are different from the determinants of real decisions, with the latter being more revealing of one's true preferences. The authors argue that psychologists, contrary to prevailing praxis, should consider making their participants' decisions more real. This could allow psychologists to more convincingly generalize laboratory findings into contexts outside of the laboratory.

— 2010 —



Goerg, S. J., & Walkowitz, G. (2010). On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 31(6), 849-859.

Abstract. In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.

— 2009 —



Falk, A., Walkowitz, G., & Wirth, W. (2009). Benachteiligung wegen mangelnden Vertrauens? Eine experimentelle Studie zur Arbeitsmarktintegration von Strafgefangenen. *Monatschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform*, 92(6), 526-546.

Abstract. Die Benachteiligung von vorbestraften Bewerbern am Arbeitsmarkt stellt ein wichtiges und zugleich komplexes Problem dar. Trotz großer Plausibilität ist ein statistisch einwandfreier Nachweis von Diskriminierung mit den gewöhnlich zur Verfügung stehenden Daten äußerst schwierig. Der Beitrag beschreibt ein kontrolliertes Entscheidungsexperiment, das Einstellungs- und Lohnzahlungsentscheidungen sowie Vertrauenserwartungen von Studenten in nicht vorbestrafte und vorbestrafte Bewerber misst und vergleicht. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ehemalige Strafgefangene deutlich geringere Chancenbesitzen, überhaupt eingestellt zu werden und einen im Vergleich angemessenen Lohn zu erhalten. Neben der Vorstrafe spielt die Nationalität des Bewerbers eine

entscheidende Rolle. Darüber hinaus können wir zeigen, dass Einstellungsentscheidungen nicht nur auf einem geringeren Vertrauen gegen-über Vorbestraften basieren, sondern dass Haftentlassene hier bewusst benachteiligt werden. Unser Forschungsansatz ist im Hinblick auf die zu untersuchende Fragestellung innovativ und wurde bislang weder in der einschlägigen soziologischen noch in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Literatur verwendet.



Lönnqvist, J. E., **Walkowitz, G.**, Wichardt, P., Lindeman, M., & Verkasalo, M. (2009). The moderating effect of conformism values on the relations between other personal values, social norms, moral obligation, and single altruistic behaviours. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 48(3), 525-546.

Abstract. Three studies predicted and found that the individual's conformism values are one determinant of whether behaviour is guided by other personal values or by social norms. In Study 1 ($N = 50$), pro-gay law reform participants were told they were either in a minority or a majority in terms of their attitude towards the law reform. Only participants who were high in conformism values conformed to the group norm on public behaviour intentions. In studies 2 ($N = 42$) and 3 ($N = 734$), participants played multiple choice prisoner's dilemma games with monetary incentives. Only participants who considered conformism values to be relatively unimportant showed the expected connections between universalism values and altruistic behaviour. Study 3 also established that the moderating effect of conformism values on the relation between universalism values and altruistic behaviour was mediated through experienced sense of moral obligation.

Other Publications

Walkowitz, G. (2024). Kann die Existenz von Vergeltungslücken ablehnende Intuitionen gegenüber Algorithmen erklären? Forthcoming. In: Jauernig, J. and M. Uhl (Eds.): *Ethik und Künstliche Intelligenz*, Springer.

Walkowitz G. & Uhl, M. (2024). Behavioral Business Ethics. In press. In: Chuah, S.-H., R. Hoffmann, and A. Neelim (Eds.). *Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics*, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Walkowitz, G. (2024). Ethik in der verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Forschung und die verhaltenswissenschaftliche Erforschung der Ethik. Forthcoming. *Acamonta*

Uhl, M. & **Walkowitz, G.** (2024). Behavioral Ethics of Technology. In press. In: Chuah, S.-H., R. Hoffmann, and A. Neelim (Eds.). *Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics*, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Geburek, D., Glöser-Chahoud, S., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2023). Das neue 'Freiberg Center for Circular Economy' an der TU Bergakademie Freiberg. *Acamonta*, 30: 67-69.

Uhl, M., Bodenschatz, A., Schönmann, M., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2022). Ethik der Künstlichen Intelligenz. In Schober, W., Overbeck, G., Persival Baroncini Proença, S., Lobo Nett, M. (Eds.), KI. Mobilität. Gesellschaft. *Basci.net – AI Bridging Society*, Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt.

Berend, P. & **Walkowitz, G.** (2013). Corporate Volunteering in der Personalpraxis. *Personal im Fokus*, 6: 30-32.

Irlenbusch, B., **Walkowitz, G.**, & Bernd, J. (2012). Welchen Beitrag kann die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung zur Förderung ethischen Handelns in der Wirtschaft leisten? *WISU – Das Wirtschaftsstudium*, 5: 681-868.

Irlenbusch, B., Neschen, A., & **Walkowitz, G.** (2011). Ethik und experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung – Beiträge zum Lügenverhalten. *Forum Wirtschaftsethik*, 2: 27-36.

Berend, P. & **Walkowitz, G.** (2007). Effektive Koordination. *Harvard Business Manager*, August: 14-15.